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Introduction

Digital signatures are widely deployed around the world and have the backing of significant international
legislation to support their use in electronic environment. In this research, we are interested in exploring
efficient identity-based proxy ring signature schemes.
Identity-based cryptography. Public-key cryptography has many different applications, but in its basic
form, it requires extensive public-key infrastructure for practical use. In order to provide more flexible management of public keys the notion of identity-based cryptography was introduced by Shamir [1]. The main
feature of identity-based cryptosystems is to remove the requirement of certification of the public keys. The
public key of each party is obtained from its public identity, such as an email address, which can uniquely
identify the party. Since the introduction of the notion in [1], various identity based schemes ([2–4]) have
been proposed.
Identity-based cryptography has attracted a lot of interest since the elliptic curve pairings are shown to
provide an elegant way for implementing identity-based encryption schemes. In the past ten years, the majority of identity-based cryptosystems proposed have relied on pairings. While extensive research has led to vast
improvements in implementation of pairings, their computational cost is still higher than that of traditional
public key algorithms which use the exponentiation operation in various groups. Moreover, pairing-based cryptosystems rely on newer and less analyzed computational assumptions in their security analysis compared to
traditional schemes that are based on classical assumptions like the widely studied RSA assumption. There
has been a proliferation of pairing-based assumptions whose difficulty is not widely understood and whose
connection to established assumptions, and to each other, remains unknown [5]. Therefore, when designing
new identity-based cryptographic primitives, it is desirable to diversify the computational assumptions and
to use widely accepted assumptions where possible.
Proxy ring signatures. The notion of proxy signatures was introduced by Mambo et al. [6] in 1996. In a
proxy signature scheme, an original signer delegates her signing right for signing messages to a proxy signer.
This kind of signature supports ensuring service availability for the customers in distributed networks to avoid
the dependency to a single server. Since the introduction of the notion of proxy signatures, several variants
?
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of proxy signatures such as proxy signatures from RSA and integer factorization problem ([7–12]), identitybased proxy signature schemes based on bilinear pairings ([13–19]), designated-verifier proxy signatures ([20–
22]), short proxy signature [23], proxy verifiably encrypted signatures [24], proxy signature schemes without
random oracles [25], identity-based multi-proxy signatures [26], proxy ring signatures ([27–31]) and identitybased proxy ring signatures from bilinear pairings ([32–39]) have been proposed.
In a proxy ring signature scheme, an original signer delegates her signing right for signing messages to a
group of proxy signers with different public keys, called the proxy agent, such that they can generate proxy
ring signatures on behalf of the original signer while he could be anonymous. This type of signature not only
supports ensuring service availability for the customers in distributed networks to avoid the dependency to a
single server but also supports preserving privacy of proxy signers. As mentioned in ([27–29]), this primitive
can be used when the requirement of proxy signer’s privacy protection is necessary. For example, it is assumed
that a parliament member would like to reveal an important news on behalf of the cabinet, while he wants
to be anonymous. The other practical motivation for this primitive is electronic voting protocols, where
just eligible voters anonymously can cast their ballots after authenticating themselves. The voting authority
(an original signer) in the voting protocol authenticates eligible voters and issues certificates (generates valid
delegations) for them. Voters (proxy signers) anonymously cast their ballots (generates proxy ring signatures).
On the one hand, employing identity-based proxy signatures violates the most important property of voting
protocols, voter privacy. Additionally, employing blind signatures in voting protocols enables the malicious
voting authority to cast its ballot instead of abstained voters, and so violates accuracy of the election. Proxy
ring signatures incorporate three requirements (privacy of voters, authentication and accuracy) at the same
time. We should highlight that some access control mechanisms are necessary in the voting protocol to provide
uniqueness property. Indeed, this primitive is a solution to the problem of electronic voting protocols based
on blind signatures in which a malicious voting authority can vote instead of abstained voters.
However, one still needs to verify public keys of proxy signers and the original signer in addition to verifying
the validity of a proxy ring signature. Therefore, for the first time, Cheng et al. proposed an identity-based
proxy ring signature [35] to facilitate public key certificate management of these types of signatures by merely
employing signer’s identities in place of the public keys and their certificates. Subsequently, there have been
some follow-up works for identity-based proxy ring signatures ([32–34, 36–39]), but unfortunately, none of
them supports provable security. In 2014, Asaar et al. [40] presented the first formal definition and security
model for identity-based proxy ring signature schemes, and also proposed the first provably secure identitybased proxy ring signature scheme, and showed that it is secure under RSA assumption in the random oracle
model. In addition, previous identity-based proxy ring signature schemes proposed in ([32–39]) are vulnerable
to the proxy key exposure attack [41] presented by Schuldt et al. in 2008. In fact, in previous schemes, if
temporal secret keys of proxy signers are leaked, long term secret keys of proxy signers will be compromised.

1.1

Our Contribution

In this paper, we present the first short identity-based proxy ring signature scheme from RSA. The proposed
scheme is proved secure under the RSA assumption, a widely accepted assumption, in the random oracle
model. The advantages of the proposed scheme are three-fold. First, it is the shortest identity-based proxy
ring signature scheme without bilinear pairings. Second, it has a proper advantage in security reduction
since reduction of the proposed scheme is independent of the number of members in a proxy ring. Third, it
is as efficient as or more efficient than existing identity-based proxy ring signature schemes. Furthermore,
the proxy key exposure attack [41] cannot be applied to our scheme since the paradigm used in designing
this primitive is sequential aggregation of an identity-based signature and an identity-based ring signature
scheme.
One may think that it is possible to build short identity-based proxy ring signature schemes without
bilinear pairings from the idea presented in [42]. We should emphasize that if we use this idea in designing
this primitive, the result is no longer identity-based since public keys according this idea are not just identities
of signers, and in this primitive, each proxy signer needs to interact before signature generation to attain
proxy signers’ public keys and cannot easily use identities of other proxy signers to generate an identity-based
proxy ring signature.
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1.2

Paper Organization

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents notations and RSA complexity assumption
employed as the signature foundation. The security model of identity-based proxy ring signature including
outline of the identity-based proxy signature scheme and its security properties are given in Section 2. The
proposed scheme and its formal security proofs are presented in Section 3. Section 4 presents the comparison
and discussion. Conclusion and future work are given in Section 5.

2

Background

In this section, first we give notations used throughout the paper and review the RSA assumption, and then
we present the outline and security definitions for the identity-based proxy ring signature schemes [40].
2.1

Notations
$

If X is a set, then x ← X denotes the operation of assigning to x an element of X chosen uniformly at random.
If x1 , x2 , ... are objects then x1 ||x2 ||... denotes an encoding of them as strings from which the constituent
objects are effectively recoverable. Let ⊥ be an empty string, |x| be the bit length of x, and θ ← C(x1 , ...)
stands for the operation of assigning the output of the algorithm C on inputs x1 , ... to θ. Let A be an
algorithm which has access to H, K, KeyExtract, DelegationGen and ProxyRingSign oracles of a signature
scheme, and can win a game in which a security property of the scheme is violated by A. If algorithm A is
(t, qh , qk , qe , qd , qprs , )-bounded, we mean that the algorithm A which runs in time at most t, makes at most
qh queries to random oracle H, qk queries to random oracle K, qe queries to KeyExtract oracle, qd queries
to DelegationGen and qprs queries to ProxyRingSign oracle can win the game with probability at least .
2.2

The RSA assumption

An RSA key generator KGrsa is an algorithm that generates triplets (N, e, d) such that N is the product of
two large primes p and q and ed = 1 mod ϕ(N ), where ϕ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1). The advantage of an algorithm
B in breaking the one-wayness of RSA related to KGrsa is defined as

$
$
(N, e, d) ←− KGrsa ; γ ←− ZN ;
ow−rsa
.
AdvKG
(B) = Pr  y = γ e mod N :
rsa
γ ←− B(N, e, y)


(1)

We say that B, (t0 , 0 )-breaks the one-wayness of RSA with respect to KGrsa if it runs in time at most t0
ow−rsa
and has advantage AdvKG
(B) ≥ 0 . We say that the RSA function associated to KGrsa is (t0 , 0 )-one-way
rsa
if there is no algorithm B that can (t0 , 0 )-break it.
2.3

Outline of identity-based proxy ring signature schemes

Let identity of each original signer be ID0 , and identity set of proxy agent and each subset of that be ID and
f respectively. The indices used in the signature description have no global meaning outside this protocol
ID,
instance, and just serve as local pointers for original and proxy signers. An identity-based proxy ring signature
scheme consists of six algorithms: Setup, KeyExtract, DelegationGen, DelegationVer, ProxyRingSign and
ProxyRingVer as follows [40].
– Setup: This algorithm takes as input the system security parameter l and outputs system’s parameters
P ara and the system’s master key (msk, mpk), i.e. (P ara, (msk, mpk)) ← P araGen(l).
– KeyExtract: This algorithm takes as input the system’s parameter P ara, master public key mpk, master
secret key msk, and an identity IDu . It outputs the corresponding secret key xu for the identity IDu ,
i.e. xu ← KeyExtract(P ara, mpk, msk, IDu ).
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– DelegationGen: This algorithm takes as input the system’s parameter P ara, the master public key
mpk, an identity IDo and an identity set ID, including at least two identities, for an original signer
and a proxy agent, respectively. It also takes as input the secret key xo of the original signer with
identity IDo and a message space descriptor w ⊆ {0, 1}∗ for which the original signer with identity
IDo delegates its signing right to a proxy agent with identity set ID, then, it outputs a delegation
σo ← DelegationGen(P ara, mpk, IDo , ID, w, xo ).
– DelegationVer: This algorithm takes as input the system’s parameter P ara, an original signer’s identity
IDo , the proxy signers’ identity set ID, a message space descriptor w and a delegation σo , then, it outputs
1 if σo is a valid delegation and outputs 0 otherwise, i.e. {0, 1} ← DelegationV er(P ara, mpk, IDo , ID, w, σo ).
– ProxyRingSign: This algorithm takes as input the system’s parameter P ara, the master public key mpk,
f of proxy signers including at least two identities, a valid delegation σo for a message
the identity set ID
f ⊆ ID and the delegation indicates
space descriptor w and an identity set ID of proxy signers such that ID
that an original signer with identity IDo delegates its signing right on w to a proxy agent with identity
$ f
set ID, a proxy signer’s secret key xj corresponding to an identity IDj ← ID
⊆ ID and a message
m ∈ w, then, it outputs the identity-based proxy ring signature θ on behalf of the original signer with
f (m, w, σo ), xj ).
identity IDo , i.e. θ ← P roxyRingSign(P ara, mpk, IDo , ID, ID,
– ProxyRingVer: This algorithm takes as input the system’s parameter P ara, an original signer’s identity
f a message space descriptor w, a signed message m and a
IDo , the proxy signers’ identity sets ID and ID,
proxy ring signature θ, then, it outputs 1 if θ is a valid identity-based proxy ring signature of the message
f ⊆ ID and outputs 0 otherwise,
m which means that it satisfies the verification equation, m ∈ w and ID
f
i.e. {0, 1} ← P roxyRingV er(P ara, mpk, IDo , ID, ID, w, m, θ).

2.4

Security models of identity-based proxy ring signature schemes

An identity-based proxy ring signature must satisfy two independent notions of security: unforgeability and
privacy of proxy signer’ identity. To achieve existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message (chosen
warrant: chosen message space descriptor and identity set of proxy signers) and chosen identity attack for
identity-based proxy ring signature schemes, three types of potential adversaries as mentioned in [27] are
considered as follows.
– Type I: This type adversary AI only has identities of the original signer and proxy signers, and aims to
forge a valid identity-based proxy ring signature w.r.t. identities of the original signer and proxy signers.
– Type II: This type adversary AII has secret keys of some (one/all) proxy signers in a proxy group in
addition to identities of the original signer and proxy signers, and aims to forge a valid identity-based
proxy ring signature w.r.t. identities of the original signer and proxy signers.
– Type III: This type adversary AIII has the secret key of the original signer in addition to identities of
the original signer and proxy signers, and aims to forge a valid identity-based proxy ring signature w.r.t.
identities of the original signer and proxy signers.
Clearly, if an identity-based proxy ring signature scheme is secure against Type II (or Type III) adversaries
then it is also secure against Type I adversary. Unforgeability against Type I, Type II and Type III adversaries
(AI , AII and AIII ) is formalized using the following game between a challenger C and an adversary A.
1. Setup: The challenger C runs the P araGen algorithm with a security parameter l to obtain system’s
parameter para and the master key (mpk, msk), then it sends (mpk, para) to A.
A issues a polynomially bounded number of queries to the following oracles adaptively:
2. KeyExtract queries: A can ask for the secret key corresponding to each identity IDu , then C returns the
private key xu to the adversary with running the KeyExtract algorithm.
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3. DelegationGen queries: Adversary A can request a delegation under the identity IDo of an original
signer on a message space descriptor w and an identity set ID of its choice for which the original
signer with identity IDo delegates its signing right on w to a proxy agent with identity set ID. In response, C runs the KeyExtract algorithm to obtain the secret key xo of the original signer, and returns
σo ← DelegationGen(P ara, mpk, IDo , ID, w, xo ) to A.
f to C.
4. ProxyRingSign queries: Adversary A can request the proxy ring signature of m w.r.t. ID
In addition, adversary A provides a delegation σo of an original signer with identity IDo for a message space descriptor w and an identity set ID of proxy signers. This delegation was obtained from
DelegationGen algorithm or was generated by adversary A.
Algorithm C checks that σo is a valid delegation in which the original signer with identity IDo delegates
f ⊆ ID;
its signing right for the message space descriptor w to the proxy agent with identity set ID; that ID
and that m ∈ w. If any of these fails to hold, returns ⊥. Otherwise, C runs the KeyExtract algorithm to
$ f
obtain the secret key xj corresponding to one of the proxy signers with identity IDj such that IDj ← ID.
f (m, w, σo ), xj ) to
Next, C runs ProxyRingSign algorithm θ ← P roxyRingSign(P ara, mpk, IDo , ID, ID,
generate the proxy ring signature θ and returns it to the adversary A.
5. Finally, A outputs a valid identity-based proxy ring signature (m∗ , w∗ , θ∗ ) w.r.t. original signer’s identity
g∗ ⊆ ID∗ \ ID
d∗ , where ID
d∗ is the set of corrupted proxy
IDo∗ and proxy signers’ identity sets ID∗ and ID
signers, and wins the game if the following conditions hold.
For A = AI :
g∗ have not been requested to the KeyExtract oracle which means
– E0 : IDo∗ and all identities in ID
that AI does not have secret keys corresponding to them.
– E1 : The pair (w∗ , ID∗ ) has not been requested as one of the DelegationGen queries under the identity
IDo∗ .
g∗ .
– E2 : m∗ has not been requested as one of the ProxyRingSign queries under the identity set ID
The formal definition of existential unforgeability against adversary AI [40] is expressed in Definition 1.
Definition 1. An identity-based proxy ring signature is (t, qh , qe , qd , qprs , )-existentially unforgeable against
adaptive chosen message (warrant) and chosen identity attack if there is no (t, qh , qe , qd , qprs , )-bounded
adversary A which wins the aforementioned game.
For A = AII :
– E0 : IDo∗ has not been requested as one of the KeyExtract queries which means AII does not have the
secret key corresponding to IDo∗ .
– E1 : The pair (w∗ , ID∗ ) has not been requested as one of the DelegationGen queries under the identity
IDo∗ .
The formal definition of existential unforgeability against adversary AII [40] is expressed in Definition 2.
Definition 2. An identity-based proxy ring signature is (t, qh , qe , qd , )-existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message (warrant) and chosen identity attack if there is no (t, qh , qe , qd , )-bounded adversary A
which wins the aforementioned game.
For A = AIII :
g∗ has not been requested as one of the KeyExtract queries which means that
– E0 : Each identity in ID
g∗ .
AIII does not have the secret keys corresponding to identities in ID
∗
g∗ ⊆ ID∗ .
– E1 :m has not been requested as one of the ProxyRingSign queries under identity set ID
The formal definition of existential unforgeability against adversary AIII [40] is expressed in Definition 3.
Definition 3. An identity-based proxy ring signature is (t, qh , qe , qprs , )- existentially unforgeable against
adaptive chosen message (warrant) and chosen identity attack if there is no (t, qh , qe , qprs , )-bounded adversary A which wins the aforementioned game.
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Privacy of proxy signer’s identity (PPSI) in an identity-based proxy ring signature means that it should
be infeasible for any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) distinguisher D to tell which proxy signer in a
proxy group generates θ on a message m. To have a formal definition for this property consider the following
game between a challenger C and a distinguisher D.

1. Setup: The challenger C runs the P araGen algorithm with a security parameter l to obtain system’s
parameter para and the master key (mpk, msk), then it sends (mpk, para) to D.
The distinguisher D issues a polynomially bounded number of KeyExtract, DelegationGen and ProxyRingSign queries adaptively as explained in the forgery game.
2. the distinguisher D chooses two honest identities ID1 and ID2 (D never make KeyExtract query for
these two identities), and makes a DelegationGen and ProxyRingSign query on (w, ID) under an idenf = {ID0 , ID1 } ⊆ ID, respectively.
tity IDo and on the message m ∈ w under the identity set ID
$

In response, C chooses j ← {0, 1}, runs KeyExtract for IDo and IDj to obtain their corresponding secret keys, and runs DelegationGen on (w, ID) under the identity IDo to obtain σo and returns
f (w, m, σo ), xj ) to D.
θ ← P roxyRingSign(P ara, mpk, IDo , ID, ID,
0
3. Finally, the distinguisher D outputs j and wins the game if j 0 = j.
The formal definition for privacy of proxy signer’s identity [40] is given in definition 4.
Definition 4. (Privacy of the proxy signer’s identity). An identity-based proxy ring signature scheme is
(t, qh , qe , qd , qprs ,  + 12 )-PPSI-secure if there is no (t, qh , qe , qd , qprs ,  + 12 )-bounded adversary D which can
win the aforementioned game.
If the probability is equal to 12 , the scheme satisfies privacy of the proxy signer’s identity perfectly.

3

Our identity-based proxy ring signature scheme

In this section, we present an identity-based proxy ring signature scheme using sequential aggregation of
GQ identity-based signature [43] and the identity-based ring signature scheme [44]. Our scheme generates an
identity-based proxy ring signature scheme in a way that a delegation is original signer’s GQ identity-based
signature on a message space descriptor and proxy signers’ identities concatenated with 11, and a proxy ring
signature is sequential aggregation of a delegation and a ring signature generated by one of the proxy signers
on a message, belonged to the message space descriptor concatenated with 11. Indeed, concatenation with
11 prevents trivial attacks as suggested by Boldyreva et al. [45].
3.1

Details of identity-based proxy ring signature scheme

In this section, we present the details of our scheme. When describing the signature scheme, let identity
of each original signer be IDo , and identity set of each proxy agent and each subset of that be ID and
f respectively. The indices used in the signature description have no global meaning outside this protocol
ID,
instance which means that there is no certified relationship between indices and identities, and just serve as
local pointers for original and proxy signers.
It is assumed that n ≥ 2 and z ≥ 2 are the number of identities for proxy signers in the proxy agent and
f of ID, respectively. Our scheme consists of Setup, KeyExtract, DelegationGen,
the size of each subset ID
DelegationVer, ProxyRingSign and ProxyRingVer algorithms as described below.
1. Setup: The system parameters are as follows. Let l0 , l1 and lN ∈ N, and let K0 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l0 ,
K1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l1 and H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗N be random oracles. Let KGrsa be a RSA key pair generator
that outputs triplets (N, e, d) such that ϕ(N ) > 2lN and with prime encryption exponents e of length
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strictly greater than l0 and l1 bits. The key distribution center runs KGrsa to generate RSA parameters
(N, e, d). It publishes mpk = (N, e) as the master public key, and keeps the master secret key msk = d
secret. Therefore, public parameters are P ara = {K0 , K1 , H} and mpk.
2. KeyExtract: On input master secret key msk = d and the user identity IDu , the key distribution center computes xu = H(IDu )d mod N , and sends the user secret key xu over a secure and authenticated
channel to the user with identity IDu .
3. DelegationGen: Let w be a message space descriptor for which an original signer with identity IDo would
like to delegate her signing right to a group of proxy signers with an identity set ID, the delegation
$
is σo = (Ro , so ) = (roe mod N, ro xcoo mod N ), where ro ← Z∗N and co = K0 (Ro ||w||ID||11). Then, the
original signer publishes the delegation σo on (w, ID).
4. DelegationVer: Given the identity IDo of an original signer and identity set ID of the proxy signers, a
message space descriptor w and a delegation σo , a verifier checks if the relation seo = Ro H(IDo )co holds,
where co = K0 (Ro ||w||ID||11). If so, the delegation is valid; otherwise, it is not valid.
$ f
5. ProxyRingSign: A proxy signer with identity IDj ← ID
⊆ ID (j ∈ {0, ..., z − 1}) can sign a message
m ∈ w anonymously on behalf of the original signer with the identity IDo with his secret key xj and a
valid delegation σo as follows.
$
f
– The proxy signer IDj chooses r ← Z∗N , computes R = re mod N and cj+1 = K1 (R||ID||ID||ID
j ||w||
m||11).
$

– For j + 1 ≤ u ≤ j − 1 (let the index u be module z), the proxy signer IDj chooses ru ← Z∗N , and
f
computes Ru = rue mod N and cu+1 = K1 (Ru H(IDu )cu Ro H(IDo )co ||ID||ID||ID
u ||w||m||11).
– The proxy signer IDj computes rj = r cj mod N .
so xj

– The proxy ring signature is θ = (Ro , r0 ..., rz−1 , c0 ) on the message m and the message space descripf ⊆ ID of proxy signers.
tor w under original signer’s identity IDo and an identity subset ID
f of the proxy
6. ProxyRingVer: Given the identity IDo of an original signer and the identity sets ID and ID
signers, a message space descriptor w, a message m, and a proxy ring signature θ, a verifier operates as
follows:
– Checks if m ∈ w, otherwise, it stops.
f ⊆ ID, otherwise, it stops.
– Checks if ID
f
– For 0 ≤ u ≤ z − 1, computes Ru = rue and cu+1 = K1 (Ru H(IDu )cu Ro H(IDo )co ||ID||ID||ID
u ||w||m
||11), and accepts the signature if and only if cz = c0 , where co = K0 (Ro ||w||ID||11).
3.2

Analysis of the scheme

In this section, we verify the correctness, and prove the privacy of the proxy signer’s identity and existential
unforgeability of the proposed scheme in the random oracle model (see [46] for the background). In order to
prove unforgeability of the proposed scheme, we need to show that it is unforgeable against adversaries of
types II and III (as defined in Section 2.4).
To prove unforgeability of our proposed scheme, and by contradiction, assuming an adversary AζII+(1−ζ)III ,
ζ ∈ {0, 1}, (the parameter ζ makes difference between adversaries AII and AIII ) we show that there is a solver
(algorithm B) that can solve a random instance of the RSA problem with a non-negligible probability. To
do this, we show that there exists a simulator CAζII+(1−ζ)III that can simulate the signature scheme without
knowing the secret key(s) of the honest signer(s), and runs the adversary AζII+(1−ζ)III as its sub-routine. In
this regard, we compute the run-time and a lower-bound for the success probability of this simulator in terms
of the run-time and success probability of the adversary and the number of queries to the oracles. Then, B
uses the oracle replay technique [47] to solve an instance (N, e, y) of the RSA problem, using a useful pair
that CAζII+(1−ζ)III outputs when the random string used in both simulations are the same. In this case, we
compute a lower bound for the probability of producing such a useful pair and solving the RSA instance as
the main body of the solver algorithm B.
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To start let us verify the correctness of the proposed scheme, and we use the fact that u is module z. Note
that, all computations are done modulo N , but we omit this for simplicity.
rje H(IDj )cj Ro H(IDo )co
= ( r cj )e H(IDj )cj Ro H(IDo )co
=(

so xj
re
ec
seo xj j

)H(IDj )cj Ro H(IDo )co

R
Ro H(IDo )co H(IDj )cj

=
= R.

cj

(2)
co

H(IDj ) Ro H(IDo )

Also, in what follows we will be needing the following Splitting lemma.
Lemma 1. [47]. Let A ⊂ X × Y such that Pr[(x, y) ∈ A] ≥ δ. For any α < δ, define B = {(x, y) ∈
X × Y | Pry0 ∈Y [(x, y 0 ) ∈ A] ≥ δ − α} and B̄ = (X × Y ) \ B, then the following statements hold:
– Pr[B] ≥ α
– ∀(x, y) ∈ B, Pry0 ∈Y [(x, y 0 ) ∈ A] ≥ δ − α
– Pr[B|A] ≥ αδ .
Theorem 1. The proposed scheme is (t, qH , qK0 , qE , qd , )-secure against an adversary AII if the RSA function associated to Kgrsa is (t0 , 0 )-one-way, and
2 (1−2−l0 )

2
0 ≥ 4(q
,
K0 +qd )
0
t ≤ 2(t + (qH + qE + 2qd )te ),

(3)

where 2 ≥ 4qE − qd (2qd + qK0 )2−lN − 2−l0 , te is the time of an exponentiation in Z∗N , and qH , qK0 , qE
and qd are the number of queries to the oracles H, K0 , KeyExtract and DelegationGen, respectively.
Proof. Given the adversary AII , we construct another algorithm B which runs CAII on inputs (N, e, y =
1
γ e mod N ). The B’s goal is to output γ = y e mod N . Algorithm CAII runs AII , which breaks existential
unforgeability of the proposal, on inputs mpk = (N, e) and answers AII ’s oracle queries. Since AII has secret
keys of all proxy signers, it can generate valid proxy ring signatures if and only if it forges a valid delegation.
It is assumed that algorithm CAII maintains initially empty associative arrays T [.] and TK0 [.], and answers
AII ’s oracle queries as follows.
– K0 (Ro ||w||ID||11) queries: If TK0 [Ro ||w||ID||11] is defined then CAII returns its value; otherwise, CAII
$

chooses TK0 [Ro ||w||ID||11] ← {0, 1}l0 , and returns TK0 [Ro ||w||ID||11] to AII .
– H(IDu ) queries: If T [IDu ] = (b, xu , Xu ) then CAII returns Xu . If this entry is not yet defined, it chooses
$

xu ← Z∗N and tosses a biased coin b so that b = 0 with probability β and b = 1 with probability 1 − β. If
b = 0, then CAII sets Xu = xeu mod N ; if b = 1, it sets Xu = xeu y mod N . It stores T [IDu ] ← (b, xu , Xu )
and returns Xu to AII .
– KeyExtract queries for IDu : Algorithm CAII looks up T [IDu ] = (b, xu , Xu ), if this entry is not yet defined, it performs a query H(IDu ). If b = 0, then CAII returns xu ; otherwise, it sets badKE ← true and
aborts the execution of AII .
– DelegationGen queries for (w, ID) under identity IDo : Algorithm CAII performs a query H(IDo ) and
looks up T [IDo ] = (b, xo , Xo ). If b = 0, then CAII simulates the delegation of IDo with the DelegationGen
algorithm σo ← DelegationGen(P ara, mpk, xo , w, ID) since CAII knows xo , the original signer’s secret
$

$

key. If b = 1, CAII first chooses co ← {0, 1}l0 and so ← Z∗N , and computes Ro ← seo Xo−co mod N . If
TK0 [Ro ||w||ID||11] has already been defined, then CAII sets badDG ← true and halts; otherwise, it sets
TK0 [Ro ||w||ID||11] ← co , and returns σo = (Ro , so , co ) to AII .
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Finally, it is assumed that AII outputs a valid forgery in the form of (Ro , so , co ) on a message m and a
warrant w under original signer’s identity IDo with probability at least  in time bound t provided that CAII
does not abort in signature simulation. First, we compute the lower-bound of the probability that CAII does
not abort at answering to queries of AII , we need to compute η = Pr[¬badKE ] Pr[¬badDG |¬badKE ], where
events badKE and badDG indicate that CAII aborts in signature simulation as a result of AII ’s KeyExtract
and DelegationGen queries, respectively. These probabilities are computed as follows.
Claim 1. Pr[¬badKE ] ≥ β qE .
Proof. Pr[¬badKE ] is the probability that CAII does not abort as a result of AII ’s KeyExtract queries.
The algorithm CAII aborts at answering to a KeyExtract query when badKE is set to true which means
that b = 1 for a given identity. The probability of this event is 1 − β, so the probability that CAII does
not abort for one KeyExtract query is β. Since AII makes at most qE KeyExtract queries, the probability
that CAII does not abort as a result of qE KeyExtract queries is at least β qE .
Claim 2. Pr[¬badDG |¬badKE ] ≥ 1 − qd ((qd + qK0 )2−lN ) − qd2 2−lN .
Proof. Events ¬badKE and ¬badDG are independent, so Pr[¬badDG |¬badKE ] = Pr[¬badDG ]. The value
of Pr[¬badDG ] is the probability that CAII does not abort as a result of DelegationGen queries. The
algorithm CAII aborts at answering to a DelegationGen query if badDG is set to true which means that
there is a conflict in the table TK0 [.]. The probability of finding a conflict in TK0 [.] for one DelegationGen
query (w||ID, IDo ) equals the probability that (Ro ||w||ID||11) generated in a DelegationGen simulation
has been occurred by chance in a previous query to the oracle K0 . Since there are at most qK0 + qd entries
in the table TK0 [.] and the number of Ro , uniformly distributed in ZN , is 2lN , the probability of this
event for one DelegationGen query is at most (qd + qK0 )2−lN . Hence, the probability of this event for
qd queries is at most qd (qd + qK0 )2−lN . In addition, this probability includes the probability that CAII
previously used the same randomness Ro , uniformly distributed in ZN , in one DelegationGen simulation.
Since there are at most qd DelegationGen simulations, this probability is at most qd 2−lN . Therefore, for
qd DelegationGen queries, the probability of this event is at most qd2 2−lN .
Therefore, the probability that CAII does not halt in signature simulation is at least η ≥ β qE − qd (2qd +
qK0 )2−lN .
Since the forgery is valid, we have seo = Ro (H(IDo ))co , AII has not asked the warrant (w||ID) from
DelegationGen algorithm under original signer’s identity IDo and IDo has not asked as a KeyExtract query.
Also, the probability of having H(IDo ) = xeo y is 1−β. Then, CAII looks up T [.] for IDo to obtain the value xo ,
and returns a useful output (Ro , so , co , xo ) with probability 1 ≥ (1 − β)η ≥ (1 − β)β qE − qd (2qd + qK0 )2−lN .
The value of β qE (1 − β) is maximized for β = qEqE+1 . With substituting the value of β, we obtain β qE (1 − β) =
( qEqE+1 )qE qE1+1 = q1E (1− qE1+1 )1+qE . If qE = 0, this value is 1 and (1− qE1+1 )1+qE is a monotonically increasing
sequence for qE ≥ 1. Therefore, the lower bound of β qE (1 − β) is 4q1E . As a consequence, CAII returns a
useful output (Ro , so , co , xo ) with probability 1 ≥ 4qE − qd (2qd + qK0 )2−lN
Since K0 is a random oracle, the probability of the event that co = K0 (Ro ||w||ID||11)) is less than 2−l0 ,
unless it is asked during the attack. Hence, in what follows it is likely that query (Ro ||w||ID||11) has been
asked during a successful attack. The lower bound of probability of producing a valid forgery after making
query to K0 oracle is 2 ≥ 1 − 2−l0 . Then, B uses the oracle replay technique [47] to solve the RSA problem.
Algorithm B employs two copies of CAII , guesses a fixed index 1 ≤ κ ≤ (qK0 + qd ) and hopes that κ be
the index of query (Ro ||w||ID||11) to oracle K0 for which AII forges a delegation, and the probability of a
good guess by chance is (qK 1+qd ) . Algorithm B gives the same system parameters, the same identities and
0
the same sequence of random bits to the two copies of CAII , and responds with the same random answers to
their queries for the oracles until they ask the oracle K0 for κth query. At that point (the κth query to the
oracle K0 ), B gives two random answers co and c0o such that co 6= c0o to the hash queries Kκ (forking). Hence,
B obtains two useful outputs (a useful pair) (Ro , so , co , xo ) and (Ro , s0o , c0o , xo ) after AII asks the same query
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(Ro ||w||ID||11) from K0 . We employ Splitting Lemma to compute the probability of B in returning a useful
pair.
It is assumed that Γ denotes the set of successful executions of CAII , and its success probability of CAII in
returning a useful output is taken over the space (X, Y ), where X is the set of random bits and random oracle
responses that CAII takes up except for randomness related to the oracle K0 , and Y is the set of random
oracle responses to the oracle K0 . Hence, we have Pr[(X, Y ) ∈ Γ ] = 2 . With Splitting Lemma, we split the
randomness Y related to K0 to (Y 0 , co ), where Y 0 is the set of all random responses to different queries of K0
except for κth query whose answer is denoted as co . The Splitting Lemma ensures the existence of a subset of
executions Ω such that Pr[Ω|Γ ] ≥ γδ = 12 , and for each (X, Y ) ∈ Ω, Prc0o [(X, Y 0 , c0o ) ∈ Γ ] ≥ δ − γ = 2(qK2+qd ) .
0

If B replays the attack with fixed (X, Y 0 ) and a randomly chosen c0o ∈ {0, 1}l0 , it gets another successful pair
−l0
)
2 (1−2
((X, Y 0 ), c0o ) such that co 6= c0o with probability 4(q
.
K0 +qd )
After two successful executions of CAII , B obtains ((X, Y 0 ), co ) and ((X, Y 0 ), c0o ), co 6= c0o which means that
2 (1−2−l0 )

2
it obtains a useful pair (Ro , so , co , xo ) and (Ro , s0o , c0o , xo ) with probability 0 ≥ 4(q
, where 2 ≥ 1 −2−l0 .
K0 +qd )
0
0
From the useful pair (Ro , so , co , xo ) and (Ro , so , co , xo ), B computes the RSA inversion of y as follows.
Since these useful outputs are derived from valid forgeries, we have

seo = Ro (xeo y)co
and

0

e co
s0e
o = Ro (xo y) .
(c0 −c )

0

By dividing the two aforementioned equations, we obtain (xo o o ss0o )e = y (co −co ) mod N . Since co 6= c0o ∈
o
{0, 1}l0 and e is a prime of length strictly greater than l0 , we have e > (co −c0o ) and therefore gcd(e, (co −c0o )) =
1. Using the extended Euclidean algorithm, one can find a, b ∈ Z such that ae + b(co − c0o ) = 1. Hence, we
0
(c0 −c )
(c0 −c )
have y = y ae+b(co −co ) = (y a (xo o o ss0 )b )e mod N . Therefore, algorithm B outputs (y a (xo o o ss0 )b ) as the
RSA inversion of y with probability 0 .
Algorithm B’s run-time t0 is twice of AII ’s run-time, t, plus the time required to respond to hash queries,
qE KeyExtract and qd DelegationGen queries. To estimate the required time of signature simulation, it is
assumed that a (multi-) exponentiation in ZN takes te time while all other operations take zero time. Since
each random oracle H or KeyExtract query takes at most one exponentiation, a delegation simulation takes
2 exponentiations, B’s run-time is t0 ≤ 2(t + (qH + qE + 2qd )te ). This completes the proof.
Theorem 2. The proposed scheme is (t, qH , qK1 , qE , qprs , )-secure against an adversary AIII if the RSA
function associated to Kgrsa is (t0 , 0 )-one-way, and
−l1 2

−l1

) (1−2
)
1 −z2
0 ≥ 8(q(
,
K1 +qprs )(qK1 +qprs +1)
t0 ≤ 2(t + (qH + qE + (2z + 1)qprs )te ),

(4)

2
where 1 ≥ ( 22zqz − (2qprs
+ qprs qK1 )2−lN ), te is the time of an exponentiation in Z∗N , and qH , qK0 ,
e
qK1 , qE and qprs are the number of queries to the oracles H, K0 , K1 , KeyExtract and P roxyRingSign,
respectively.

Proof. Given the adversary AIII , we construct another algorithm B which runs CAIII on inputs (N, e, y =
1
γ e mod N ). The B’s goal is to output γ = y e mod N . Algorithm CAIII runs AIII , which breaks existential
unforgeability of the proposal, on inputs mpk = (N, e) and answers AIII ’s oracle queries. Since AIII has the
secret key of the original signer, it can simulate delegations by itself, and the oracle access to DelegationGen
is not necessary. It is assumed that algorithm CAIII maintains initially empty associative arrays T [.], TK0 [.]
and TK1 [.], and answers AIII ’s oracle queries as follows.
– K0 (Ro ||w||ID||11) queries: If TK0 [Ro ||w||ID||11] is defined then CAIII returns its value, otherwise CAIII
$

chooses TK0 [Ro ||w||ID||11] ← {0, 1}l0 , and returns TK0 [Ro ||w||ID||11] to AIII .

11
cu
co
f
f
– K1 (Ru H(IDu )cu Ro H(IDo )co ||ID||ID||ID
u ||w||m||11) queries: If TK1 [Ru H(IDu ) Ro H(IDo ) ||ID||ID
cu
||IDu ||w||m||11] is defined then CAIII returns its value; otherwise, CAIII chooses TK1 [Ru H(IDu ) Ro
$
l1
cu
co
f
f
H(IDo )co ||ID||ID||ID
u ||w||m||11] ← {0, 1} , and returns TK1 [Ru H(IDu ) Ro H(IDo ) ||ID||ID||
IDu ||w||m||11] to AIII .

– H(IDu ) queries: If T [IDu ] = (b, xu , Xu ) then CAIII returns Xu . If this entry is not yet defined, it chooses
$

xu ← Z∗N and tosses a biased coin b so that b = 0 with probability β and b = 1 with probability 1 − β. If
b = 0, then CAIII sets Xu = xeu mod N ; if b = 1, it sets Xu = xeu y mod N . It stores T [IDu ] ← (b, xu , Xu )
and returns Xu to AIII .
– KeyExtract queries for IDu : Algorithm CAIII looks up T [IDu ] = (b, xu , Xu ), if this entry is not yet
defined, it performs a query H(IDu ). If b = 0, then CAII returns xu ; otherwise, it sets badKE ← true
and aborts the execution of AIII .
f Adversary AIII provides a delegation σo on a message
– ProxyRingSign queries for a message m w.r.t. ID:
space descriptor w and an identity set ID. Algorithm CAIII first checks if the delegation for (w, ID)
f ⊆ ID. If so, CA
is valid under identity IDo , if m ∈ w and if ID
proceeds as follows. If bu = 0
III
for some 0 ≤ u ≤ z − 1, CAIII knows some xu and can generate a valid proxy ring signature follow$

ing ProxyRingSign algorithm. If for all 0 ≤ u ≤ z − 1, we have bu = 1, CAIII chooses c0 ← {0, 1}l1
$

and ru ← Z∗N for 0 ≤ u ≤ z − 1, and computes Ru = rue mod N . For 0 ≤ u ≤ z − 2, computes cu =
cz−1
f
f
K1 (Ru H(IDu )cu Ro H(IDo )co ||ID||ID||ID
Ro H(IDo )co ||ID||ID||
u ||w||m||11), if TK1 [Rz−1 H(IDz−1 )
IDz−1 ||w||m||11] has already been defined, then CAIII sets badP S ← true and halts; otherwise, it sets
f
TK1 [Rz−1 H(IDz−1 )cz−1 Ro H(IDo )co ||ID||ID||ID
z−1 ||w||m||11] ← c0 and returns the proxy ring signature θ = (Ro , r0 ..., rz−1 , c0 ) on the message m and the message space descriptor w w.r.t. original signer’s
f for proxy signers to AIII .
identity IDo and two identity sets ID and ID
Finally, it is assumed that AIII outputs a valid forgery θ = (Ro , r0 ..., rz−1 , c0 ) on a message m and the
message space descriptor w under the original signer’s identity IDo and the proxy signers’ identity sets ID
f with probability at least  in time bound t provided that CA does not abort in signature simulaand ID
III
tion. To lower-bound the probability that CAIII does not abort at answering to queries of AIII , we need to
compute η = Pr[¬badKE ] Pr[¬badP S |¬badKE ], where events badKE and badP S indicate that CAIII aborts in
signature simulation as a result of any of AIII ’s KeyExtract and ProxyRingSign queries, respectively. These
probabilities are computed as follows.

Claim 3.

Pr[¬badKE ] ≥ β qE .

Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Claim 1.
Claim 4.

2
Pr[¬badP S |¬badKE ] ≥ 1 − qprs (qprs + qK1 )2−lN − qprs
2−lN .

Proof. Events ¬badKE and ¬badP S are independent, so Pr[¬badP S |¬badKE ] = Pr[¬badP S ]. The value of
Pr[¬badP S ] is the probability that CAIII does not abort as a result of ProxyRingSign queries. The algorithm CAIII aborts at answering to a ProxyRingSign query if badP S is set to true which means that there
is a conflict in table TK1 [.] for these kinds of queries. The probability of finding a conflict in TK1 [.] for
f
one ProxyRingSign query equals the probability that (Ru H(IDu )cu Ro H(IDo )co ||ID||ID||ID
u ||w||m||11)
generated in ProxyRingSign simulation has been occurred by chance in a previous query to the oracle
K1 . Since there are at most qK1 + qprs entries in the table TK1 [.] for these kinds of queries and the number
of Ru , uniformly distributed in ZN , is 2lN , the probability of this event for one ProxyRingSign is at most
(qprs + qK1 )2−lN . Hence, the probability of this event for qprs queries is at most qprs (qprs + qK1 )2−lN .
In addition, this probability includes the probability that CAIII previously used the same randomness
Ru , uniformly distributed in ZN , in one ProxyRingSign simulation. Since there are at most qprs Prox-
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yRingSign simulations, this probability is at most qprs 2−lN . Therefore, for qprs ProxyRingSign queries
2
the probability of this event is at most qprs
2−lN .
f
Since the forgery is valid, we have Ru = rue , cu+1 = K1 (Ru H(IDu )cu Ro H(IDo )co ||ID||ID||ID
u ||w||m||11)
for 0 ≤ u ≤ z − 1, and cz = c0 , and also AIII has not asked the message m from ProxyRingSign algorithm
f ⊆ ID and it contains z uncorrupted identities with probability at least
under proxy signer’s identity set ID
(1 − β)z . Algorithm CAIII performs additional random oracle queries H(IDu ) for identities in the forgery to
find T [IDu ] = (b, xu , Xu ) for them, and returns (Ro , r0 ..., rz−1 , c0 , {xu }0≤u≤z−1 , xo , m, w). As a result, the
probability of returning a useful output is at least (1−β)z η ≥ (1−β)z β qE −qprs (2qprs +qK1 )2−lN . The value
of β qE (1 − β)z is maximized for β = qEqE+z . With substituting the value of β, we have β qE (1 − β)z ≥ 22z1qz .
E
Since K1 is a random oracle, the probability of the event
f
cu+1 = K1 (Ru H(IDu )cu Ro H(IDo )co ||ID||ID||ID
u ||w||m||11)
for 0 ≤ u ≤ z − 1 is less than z2−l1 , unless they are asked during the attack. Hence, it is likely that
f
questions (Ru H(IDu )cu Ro H(IDo )co ||ID||ID||ID
u ||w||m||11) for 0 ≤ u ≤ z − 1 are asked during a successful
attack. The lower bound of probability of producing a useful output after making queries to K1 oracle is
2 ≥ 1 − z2−l1 .
It is assumed that Υ denotes the set of successful executions of CAIII , and its success probability of CAII in
returning a useful output after making query to K1 is taken over the space (X, Y ), where X is the set of random bits and random oracle responses that CAIII takes up except for the randomness related to the oracle K1 ,
and Y is the set of random oracle responses to the oracle K1 . Hence, we have Pr[(X, Y ) ∈ Υ ] = 2 . There is at
f
least one index ν ∈ (0, ..., z −1) such that the query Qu = (Rν H(IDν )cν Ro H(IDo )co ||ID||ID||ID
ν ||w||m||11)
cν−1
co
f
was made to the oracle K1 before query Qv = (Rν−1 H(IDν−1 )
Ro H(IDo ) ||ID||ID||IDν−1 ||w||m||11).
The pair (u, v) is called a gap index. If there are more than one gap index for a forged proxy ring signature,
only the pair with smallest value for u is considered.
(q +q
)(q +q
+1)
The cardinality of the set Υu,v as a subset of Υ with gap index (u, v) is π = K1 prs 2K1 prs .
This gives us a partition of Υ in exactly π classes. Let I be the set of most likely gap indices, I =
0
0
0
0
|Υ ] ≥ 12 π1 }. Hence, for each (u, v) ∈ I, Υu,v is denoted as Υu,v
|Υ ] Pr[Υ ] ≥
{(u, v)| Pr[Υu,v
] = Pr[Υu,v
, we have Pr[Υu,v
2
.
2π
With Splitting Lemma, we split the randomness Y related to K1 to (Y 0 , cν ), where Y 0 is the set of all
random responses to different queries of K1 except for query Qv whose answer is denoted as cν . This lemma
0
] ≥ αδ = 12 and for each
ensures the existence of a subset Ωu,v of executions (X, Y ) such that Pr[Ωu,v |Υu,v
2
0
0
0
(X, Y ) ∈ Ωu,v , Prc0ν [(ω, (ρ , cν )) ∈ Υu,v ] ≥ δ − α = 4π .
P
0
0
0
|Υ ] = (u,v)∈I Pr[Ωu,v ∩ Υu,v
|Υ ] =
are disjoint, and we have Pr(X,Y ) [∃(u, v) ∈ I s.t. Ωu,v ∩ Υu,v
Since Υu,v
P
0
(u,v)∈I Pr[Ωu,v |Υu,v ]
P

Pr[Υ 0

|Υ ]

0
0
|Υ ] ≥ (u,v)∈I 2 u,v
Pr[Υu,v
.
≥ 14 . Therefore, with probability at least 14 , (u, v) ∈ I and (X, Y ) ∈ Ωu,v ∩Υu,v
0
0
0 0
If we replay the attack with fixed (X, Y ) and a randomly chosen cν , we get another successful pair (X, (Y , cν ))
−l1
)
such that cν 6= c0ν with probability 2 (1−2
.
4π
Hence, after two successful executions of CAIII , the algorithm B obtains ((X, Y 0 ), cν ) and ((X, Y 0 ), c0ν )
2 (1−2−l1 )

(q

+q

)(q

+q

+1)

with probability 0 ≥ 2 16π , where π = K1 prs 2K1 prs , which means that B obtains a useful
0
0
, c00 , {xu }0≤u≤z−1 , xo , m, w). Since the query
pair (Ro , r00 ..., rz−1
, c00 , {xu }0≤u≤z−1 , xo , m, w) and (Ro , r00 ..., rz−1
cν
co
f
Qu = (Rν H(IDν ) Ro H(IDo ) ||ID||ID||ID
ν ||w||m||11) was made to the oracle K1 before query Qv =
(Rν−1
f
H(IDν−1 )cν−1 Ro H(IDo )co ||ID||ID||ID
ν−1 ||w||m||11), we have
0

Rν H(IDν )cν Ro H(IDo )co = Rν0 H(IDν )cν Ro H(IDo )co ,
where cν 6= c0ν and Rν = rνe .

c −c0ν rν e
rν0 )

With rearranging the above equation, we obtain (xνν

0

= y (cν −cν ) mod N .

Since cν 6= c0ν ∈ {0, 1}l1 and e is a prime of length strictly greater than l1 , we have e > (c0ν − cν ) and
therefore gcd(e, (c0ν − cν )) = 1. Using the extended Euclidean algorithm, one can find a, b ∈ Z such that
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c −c0ν rν b e
rν0 ) )

ae + b(c0ν − cν ) = 1. Hence, we have y = y ae+b(cν −cν ) = (y a (xνν
c −c0
(y a (xνν ν rrν0 )b )
ν

mod N . Therefore, algorithm B can

output
as the RSA inversion of y with probability 0 .
Algorithm B’s run-time t0 is twice of AIII ’s run-time, t, plus the time required to respond to hash queries,
qE KeyExtract and qprs ProxyRingSign queries. To estimate the required time of signature simulation, it is
assumed that a (multi-) exponentiation in ZN takes te time, while all other operations take zero time. Since
each random oracle H or KeyExtract query takes at most one exponentiation, a ProxyRingSign simulation
takes (2z + 1) exponentiations, B’s run-time is t0 ≤ 2(t + (qH + qE + (2z + 1)qprs )te ). This completes the
proof.
Theorem 3. The identity-based proxy ring signature scheme is (t, qH , qK0 , qK1 , qe , qd , qprs , 21 )-PPSI-secure
since the probability of D in guessing the identity of the proxy signer for a given signature θ, Pr[D(θ) = IDj ]
f = {ID0 , ID1 }), is 1 against (t, qH , qK , qK , qe , qd , qprs , )-bounded adversary D.
(where IDj ∈ ID
0
1
2
Proof. The distinguisher D issues a polynomially bounded number of random oracle, KeyExtract, DelegationGen and ProxyRingSign queries adaptively as explained in the proof of Theorems 1 and 2.
Then, D chooses two honest identities ID0 and ID1 for proxy ring (D never make KeyExtract query for
these two identities), and makes a DelegationGen and ProxyRingSign query on (w, ID) under an identity
f = {ID0 , ID1 } ⊆ ID, respectively. In response,
IDo and on the message m ∈ w under the identity set ID
$

C chooses j ← {0, 1}, runs DelegationGen on (w, ID) under an identity IDo to obtain σo and returns
f (w, m, σo ), xj ) to D. Finally, the distinguisher D outputs
θ ← P roxyRingSign(P ara, mpk, IDo , ID, ID,
1
0
j = j with probability 2 . To show the value of this probability, we compute the probability that IDj
generates valid values for R0 and R1 of θ which are pairwise different. The probability of choosing different
values for R0 and R1 is 2l1N 2l1N . Then, θ is computed from random numbers ru for u 6= j in Ru and r employed
in Rj . The probability of generation of the proxy ring signature θ = (Ro , r0 , r1 , c0 ) is independent from the
identity of the real signer IDj , then, this probability is the same for two members in the set of proxy signers.
Therefore, the probability of D in guessing the real signer is 21 .
3.3

On achieving identity-based proxy ring signatures without bilinear pairings in the
standard model

Although our scheme is the first short identity-based proxy ring signature which is efficient (due to the not
relying on bilinear pairings), it is proved secure in the random oracle model. In fact, an identity-based proxy
ring signature without bilinear pairings is sequential aggregation of an identity-based standard signature
without bilinear pairings (a non-interactive proof of knowledge of the secret key of an original signer) and
a non-interactive proof of knowledge of the secret key of one of the proxy signers in the proxy ring. On the
other hand, to the best of our knowledge, Fiat-Shamir heuristic is used to implement a non-interactive proof
of knowledge, and therefore its security relies on the randomness of the underlying hash function. So far
there is no scheme for identity-based proxy ring signatures without bilinear pairings with provable security
in the standard model, and hence this leads to the difficulty of achieving identity-based proxy ring signatures
without bilinear pairings in the standard model, which is an interesting future reserach problem.

4

Comparison

The comparison for some provably secure (identity-based) proxy ring signature schemes is summarized in
Table 1. The comparison is in terms of DeleGen-Cost, DeleVer-Cost , PRSign-Cost and PRVer-Cost , dominating computational cost in delegation generation, delegation verification, proxy ring signature generation
and proxy ring signature verification, respectively. In Table 1, exp denotes exponentiation in Z∗N . For the sake
f = ID.
of comparison, it is assumed that other operations take zero time and z = n which means that ID
Since previous identity-based proxy ring signature schemes ([32–39]) do not support provable security,
they are not considered in comparison. As shown in Table 1, our scheme compared to Asaar et al.’s provably
secure proxy ring signature scheme [40] has a proper advantage in signature-size. In a nutshell, since l1  |ZN |
(for example, l1 is about 160 bits, while |ZN | = 1024), the signature-size is improved by a factor |ZN | − l1 .
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Table 1. Comparison between our proposal and provably secure schemes
Scheme

Ours

DeleGen DeleVer PRSign

PRVer

Sign

Cost

Cost

Size

Cost

Cost

ID
-based
1)Z∗N

+ l1 X

X

2exp

2exp

(n + 2)exp (2n + 1)exp (n +

Asaar et al. [40] 2exp

2exp

(2n + 1)exp (n + 2)exp (n + 2)Z∗N

2


On one hand, since the probability of solving the RSA problem as shown in Theorem 4 is nearly (qK +q
2,
prs )
1
and so is independent of the number of proxy signers.
21 (1−2−l1 )
On the other hand, in [40], the probability of solving the RSA problem is 0 ≥ PqK1 +qprs −z−1
Qz−1
8

where 1 ≥
2
(qK1 +qprs )z ,


z
22z qE

j=1

[

i=0

(qK1 +qprs −i−j)]

2
− (2qprs
+ qprs qK1 )2−lN ) − (z + 1)2−l1 . With approximately estimation, the probability is

and so it is a function of the number of proxy signers in a proxy ring, z. Therefore, the security
reduction is improved.
Furthermore, since the total number of exponentiations in proxy ring signature generation and verification
for the two schemes are the same, the new scheme is as efficient as the old one.

5

Conclusion and future work

In this paper, we proposed a provably secure proxy ring signature scheme from RSA assumption. This
scheme is the first short one for this type of signature from RSA. In addition, the security reduction of
the proposal has been improved compared to the ones from RSA since it is independent of the number of
proxy signers in the proxy ring. We should highlight that the proposed scheme has a proper advantage in
efficiency due to the avoiding pairing computations since the cost of each pairing computation is roughly that
of 2.3 exponentiations. Furthermore, the proxy key exposure attack is not applicable to our scheme since it
is generated based on sequential aggregation paradigm.
Although our scheme is the first short identity-based proxy ring signature scheme which is efficient (due
to the not relying on bilinear pairings), it is proved secure in the random oracle model. According to Section
4, there is no identity-based proxy ring signature scheme without bilinear pairing with provable security in
the standard model. As a result, presenting an identity-based proxy ring signature scheme from traditional
assumptions such as RSA and discrete logarithm with provable security in the standard model is an open
problem, and proposing a scheme with the aforementioned features will be considered as a future work.
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